similarly shown that volunteer groups commonly include people with neurological disorders, which account for most of the abnormal EEGs. Binnie et al. (1978) found 14 subjects with a history of cerebral disease or head injury out of 154 adult controls. An independent EEG assessment revealed II abnormal records, 10 of which had been obtained from the subjects with a positive neurological history.
In the September 1978 issue of the Journal (p 698), Dr Pampiglione drew attention to the incorrect reporting of EEGs by untrained interpreters. One of the commonest sources of error is the misreading of unusual normal variants as abnormalities, especially in children. Yours sincerely CD BINNIE 2 March 1979 References (see p 390) From Dr M V Driver President, The Associationof British ClinicalNeurophysiologists Dear Sir, Dr Bourdillon (February, p 154)gives his address as Department of Health and Social Security. Is one to assume that what he writes is the considered and authoritative view of the DHSS on the clinical value ofEEG? Ifso, it has to be pointed out that the evidence he presents is of very poor quality.
The 'positive spikes' referred to in his Table I have been at best of controversial significancesince 1951 when Gibbs & Gibbs stated that they were evidence of cerebral dysfunction: there must be very few who believe that now. 'Mittens' are such nebulous phenomena that they were not mentioned at all in the glossary ofEEG terms published by the International Federation of EEG Societies in 1974, nor did 'small sharp spikes' warrant notice as a distinct phenomenon whether of normal or abnormal significance. The comments on EEG in aircrew are from the brief abstract of a paper read at an EEG Society meeting (O'Connor 1964), and not from a full and reasoned discussion of all available evidence. The current attitude of the armed forces to the place of EEG in aircrew selection is surely available to the DHSS.
Since the only mention of EEG in the methodology section of the paper by Hopkins & Scambier (1977) -the title of which was 'How doctors deal with epilepsy' -was to the effect that EEG information was taken into account in deciding on seizure classification, the work can hardly be described as the result of a study of the value of EEG in the management of epileptics. Hopkins & Scambler (1977) found little good to say about anything: 'The pattern of care suggests unnecessary referral, unnecessary electroencephalography, inadequate communication of the diag-nosis, inadequate medication, and follow-up supervision not related to patient need'. Does the DHSS accept all this? Should it not feel that such an indictment needs validation outside the very limited experience of these authors?
I do not think I should comment on the other evidence provided by Dr Bourdillon, except to say it is no more to be relied on than that referred to above. He ends his letter by quoting Professor W B Matthews, beneath whose hyperbole there may be an element of truth. But where does the remedy lie? Surely not in repetition of what is said to be wrong, but rather in taking steps to ensure that those aspects of EEG which are of value, and which are available in some centres both in and outside London, are made available to the whole country. This will necessitate institution of means to ensure that both the user of the service and the practitioner of the specialty have the right background, training and experience. The Association on whose behalf I write would willingly cooperate in any endeavour to bring about such an objective. (1978) or Robin et al. (1978) , or even glanced at already established textbooks and atlases such as that of Kiloh et al. (1972) is important in that it should lead to suitable management, treatment and some indication as to prognosis, However, I feel that subdividing dyslexias into primary and secondary has tended to make diagnosis more difficult and to confuse the matter further. Although it is quite understood that there are these two distinctions -in that primary dyslexia is genetically determined and typically has a familial incidence, and secondary dyslexia is usually the result of minimal brain dysfunction -the two conditions are not easily separated, since congenital only means existing at or present from birth and could well be due to an inherited condition or to some cerebral trauma, either in utero or during birth. I cannot agree with Dr Macdonald Critchley that his definition of primary dyslexia does not include speech and language delay, poor coordination, left/right confusion, occasional difficulties with arithmetic, severe difficulties in spelling and possible problems in constructional tasks, which is Michael Rutter's definition of specific reading retardation, since all the above are often present in developmental dyslexia, whatever the aetiology.
A further dimension in differential diagnosis has been added recently, in that many psychologists now talk not only about primary and secondary dyslexia, but also about deep dyslexia. It seems inappropriate to try to make differential diagnoses between these various dyslexias when what is really needed is treatment, and an accepted method has been developed over the last 40 years, culled from America, Australia, France and Denmark, which is indisputably effective in the vast majority of cases of specific reading, spelling and writing difficulties. BEVE HORNSBY 6 March 1979 Randomized clinical trials in cancer chemotherapy From Dr Dennis V Razis Head, Department of Medicine, Cancer Institute ofPiraeus, Greece Sir, When cancer chemotherapy is really effective, are randomized clinical trials necessary? The breakthroughs in modern cancer chemotherapy were not the products of prospective randomized clinical trials. High-dose-pulse methotrexate therapy in choriocarcinoma and Burkitt's tumour (Li et al. 1956 , Burkitt 1967 ,combination chemotherapy in acute lymphoblastic leukaemia in children (Freireich et al. 1964) , MOPP scheme in Hodgkin's disease (De Vita & Serpick 1967) , COP scheme in non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, '5-day 5drug' regimen in carcinoma of the breast (Cooper 1969) ,were all products of nonrandomized clinical trials. No one ever thought to compare the results of these schemes with a group of patients treated only with placebo. It is apparent that when cancer chemotherapy is really effective, randomized clinical trials are not necessary.
Why then do we need randomized clinical trials? It seems that clinical trials are useful -or even necessary -in order to demonstrate the degree of ineffectivenessof a new drug or a new combination scheme; or -to put it another way -clinical trials can prove that a new drug or a new combination scheme has a 'minimal' or at best a 'moderate' effectiveness, thus justifying the routine application in practice of this new mode of treatment. No randomized clinical trials ever proved that a new drug or a new scheme was really, dramatically effective. Clinical trials are also useful for testing a new scheme when the classical effective chemotherapy is no longer effective, for example ABVD when Hodgkin's disease becomes resistant to MOPP (Bonadonna et al. 1975) . Finally, randomized clinical trials raise conceptually-scientific clinical research above the muddle of empiricism. But can we compare the impact in clinical medicine of the modest results of randomized clinical trials, such as combination chemotherapy in carcinoma of the bowel, or even adjuvant chemotherapy in carcinoma of the breast, with the impressive breakthroughs of some nonrandomized clinical trials such as methotrexate in choriocarcinoma, MOPP in Hodgkin's disease, etc.?
The productivity of randomized clinical trials is only modest. This productivity must be compared
